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ideas'; this is false" (p. 311). It follows that the foundation of method is not sought in an analytic empirical psychology, but in a rational psychology which assumes will-reason as the governing fact throughout. Some of the chapters in which this rational psychology is worked out, are, as we have said, by no means easy reading, but they are emphatically worth mastering. From his psychological results Professor Laurie deduces his main principles of methodology, and we are glad to see that these have been reduced to a much more systematic form than they presented in the first edition of the book.

When he passes to ethical education, Professor Laurie shows that no new principles are involved. Not only is all education ethical in the widest sense, in that it leads Will to use its materials aright, but ethical education in the narrower sense follows the same general principles of method as does intellectual education. The chief difference is that whilst in intellectual education we instruct by presentation, in ethical education we instruct by training, for "perception is here perception of a *feeling* in activity" (p. 320). The whole subject is admirably worked out and the chapters on moral authority are amongst the best in the book. They cannot be profitably summarized, they should be read and thought over, and—still more important—practised by all who aspire to be educators. The whole book, indeed, is one which must attract both the attention and the respect of all who are interested in the great subject of which it treats, a subject which our author calls "the chief aim of all politics," and of which he says, "to the teacher, more than to any other, the future belongs" (p. 426). This book should do much to so form and influence the teacher that he may perform his great work well.

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DEMOCRACY AND EMPIRE, WITH STUDIES OF THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS. By Franklin Henry Giddings, M. A., Ph. D., Professor in Columbia University, New York, author of "The Principles of Sociology." New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900. Pp. vii, 363.

The title of this book, along with the statements in the Preface, lead the reader to expect something more systematic than he finds.

As matter of fact, two-thirds of the book has little or nothing to do with the relations of democracy and empire. The remainder that does occupy itself with this subject-matter is somewhat miscellaneous in character, and seems on the whole the least satisfactory part of the volume. When one compares it with an illuminating historical and critical treatment of substantially the same theme, in a special instance, like the late Professor Seeley's "The Expansion of England," it suffers materially. At the same time, all is interesting, vigorous and makes the reader think.

The question that is occupying the minds of not a few on this side of the water at the present time is, how can a democracy, consistently with its own principles, conduct imperial rule? If it attempts to do so, what is likely to be the effect upon those principles? By imperial rule is meant rule without the consent of the people ruled. The Queen of England, for example, is not called Empress of Canada or of Australia, but she is "Empress of India."

Americans are particularly embarrassed in discussing the question with reference to their own case, since the fathers of the American state made some references to the rights of "all men" and put forth the general statement that governments derive their just powers "from the consent of the governed." Englishmen have never been so imprudent as that. English democracy is one thing, and English rule in India is quite another—they are conducted on different principles. It was so with the Athenian democracy and its empire, the Athenians being quite innocent of "views" about the rights of barbarians. But Americans have a tough nut to crack. How does Professor Giddings help us out?

In the first place, he shows that states have rarely, if ever, been founded on the consent of the governed—something that the fathers probably never doubted; and that the American state has not been as true as it might have been to the spirit of its principle—something their children must confess.* Further, he minimizes the principle, by saying that it really means simply the

*The suppression of the "Rebellion," however, is not a case in point. The "Rebellion" was neither more nor less than an attempt to break up a certain political unity. If the "States" who wanted to secede had been forced into the "Union," in the first place, as Professor Giddings intimates was the case with Rhode Island, his reference would be appropriate. The people of the entire country by their free consent formed the Union (and this is all that "the consent of the governed" means—it is a political, not a

probable consent of the governed *in the future*, when they shall have a chance to reflect on the benefits of the treatment to which they have been subjected—the governors apparently being the judge of the probabilities. But as this would justify almost any aggression, the only limit being the inflation and assurance of the aggressing party, it is evident that the thoughtful among us can get little help in the present predicament from it.

Secondly, in relation to the policy this country is now entering upon (unless there is a change of government in the near future) Professor Giddings, instead of discussing it in the light of ethical considerations, regards it as *fatum*—"as certain as the advent of spring after winter," a part of "cosmic law,"—and opposition to it as futile as "opposition to the trade-wind or the storm" (p. 270). Now, of course, we cannot do much with trade-winds or cosmic law, and, if the case is so, must submit. All the same our reason is not satisfied—and we are accustomed to think that in questions of action, even if not of historical fact, reason may have a voice. Moreover, Professor Giddings elsewhere in these discussions gives full scope to ethical considerations, so that we are at a loss to understand his rather ostentatious dismissal of them here*—unless he feels that in this case they tend in another direction. Indeed, he is not as considerate with us as the initiator of the policy, our Chief Magistrate himself, who urged not that destiny settled matters, but that "duty determines destiny," and who has always in his speeches presented considerations of national responsibility and obligation. And when we look into the basis of Professor Giddings's contention about "destiny," we find the "array of impregnable facts" resolving themselves into a prospect of certain "economic advantages," along with the desirability of a "friendly alliance with Great Britain," and of uniting with her against "the Russian-Chinese combination" (pp. 279-289). This then is the practical meaning of "cosmic law"! We suspect that

particularistic, principle, applying to peoples not to individuals as such) and the people alone could dissolve it. The coercion of individuals (or even sections) belongs to any State; who fundamentally authorize the coercion (how wide the basis of consent is) determines the *form* of the State.

*He says, "In attempting to answer these questions, let us confine ourselves to the observation of what has been, what is, and what probably is to be, leaving the discussion of what ought to be to those who feel competent to undertake it" (p. 279).

"cosmic law" would have been just as well satisfied with a course in the Philippines like that which Sir Andrew Clarke pursued in the Malay Peninsula as with our present destructive policy—or, to come nearer home, with a course like that which this country determined upon at the outset in relation to Cuba. To identify cosmic law with a particular piece of doubtful public policy, or lack of policy, is a remarkable *tour de force*. The fact is that in not dissimilar fashion "cosmic law" might be shown to be on the side of crime or any other shameful social facts, and we be exhorted to discontinue our "idle contention" against them, instead of seeking to prevent their recurrence in the future. And imperialism is not yet a "*fait accompli*" in America.

As to the retroactive effect of imperial rule abroad on democratic principles at home, Professor Giddings does not even discuss it. For instance, Professor Seeley says: "Even where the conquering power has a much broader basis [than the Roman Republic], it is commonly altogether transformed by the effort of conquest. The wars by which the conquest is made and then the establishments necessary to maintain the conquest, call for a new system of government and finance" ("The Expansion of England," p. 247 Amer. ed.). This did not happen for England in dealing with India because of peculiar circumstances. And yet a possibility of something of the sort appears to be not quite passed. Mr. Theodore Morison, in his "Imperial Rule in India," after quoting Froude's remark that "free nations cannot govern subject provinces," says: "It is conceivable that England may one day provide an illustration of the truth of this aphorism," and adds that if an imperial sentiment is once vigorously ascendant in English politics, he can believe that for the better governing of British dependencies "we would be willing to forego some of the liberties which impede our sway in India"—and Mr. Morison, it should be said, is friendly to British rule in India. Difficulties of this sort Professor Giddings does not consider—unless we except a complacent assurance that all parts of the British Empire, including even India and the African colonies, are growing more democratic (p. 2), a statement which sounds odd when we remember that only last year Lord Salisbury's ministry was seeking to limit municipal self-government in Calcutta, and that at the same time the London Indian Society was protesting against a new sedition law.

A further difficulty about empire in general (whether conducted by a democracy or not) is thus stated by Professor Seeley:

"When the state advances beyond the limits of the nationality, its power becomes precarious and artificial. This is the condition of most empires; it is the condition, for example, of our own empire in India. . . . When a nation extends itself into other territories, the chances are that it will there meet with other nationalities which it cannot destroy or completely drive out, even if it succeeds in conquering them. When this happens, it has a great and permanent difficulty to contend with. The subject or rival nationalities cannot be completely assimilated, and remain as a permanent cause of weakness and danger" ("The Expansion of England," p. 46).

This difficulty, that so seriously confronts Americans in the Philippines, Professor Giddings does not take into account, unless it be in a general statement that "men of differing nationalities and faiths, if also of discordant minds, can live and work together for a common purpose only when a coercive power maintains order among them" (p. 63).

Professor Giddings says what commends itself in speaking of the desirability of larger political aggregates and of the protection of the semi-civilized, barbarian and savage communities of the world by the larger civilized nations. But this need not be "empire." The larger aggregates may be formed and protectorates established without violating the principle of the "consent of the governed." The British Empire, Professor Seeley remarks, "is not properly, if we exclude India from consideration, an empire at all."

We have left no space in which to discuss the solidier and weightier portions of Professor Giddings's volume. They have no necessary connection with its title—and would blend about as readily with anti-imperialism as with imperialism. A vast amount of sense as well as of sober idealism (the two are not so different) is packed into such chapters as "The Costs of Progress" and "Industrial Democracy," the substance of which first appeared in the pages of this JOURNAL—though an extraordinary attack on organized labor disfigures p. 132. The tolerant and genial temper of the author is happily displayed in a passage like the following (p. 87):

"In its larger being [the reference is to social organization in the future], individualism, socialism and communism will not be the mutually exclusive things that they now seem to be. There will not be a narrower but a wider field for individual effort, not

less but more personal liberty. At the same time, more enterprises will be brought under public control; and more of the good things of life will be distributed, like the sunshine and the air, in free and equal portions. The displaced men and women will be more quickly reestablished than now, their services will be made of greater value, and society will assume a larger portion of the burden of their misfortunes."

Expressions of this sort should be remembered when one reads elsewhere (p. 220) that socialism is "an attempt to emancipate everybody by shackling every individual arm" and that its method "is that of compelling everybody to meddle with everything that is none of his business, and of forbidding him, under any circumstances, to mind his own business."

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DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. Vol. III., N-Z. Edited by R. H. Inglis Palgrave, F. R. S. London: Macmillan & Co., 1899. Pp. xxii., 762.

Reviewing a volume of Palgrave's "Dictionary of Political Economy" is much like reviewing a volume of the "Encyclopedia Britannica"; that is to say, it is quite impossible without writing a book of considerable size. All we can offer here, therefore, is a brief notice and appreciation of the work before us.

To begin with we heartily congratulate Mr. Palgrave and his collaborators on the completion of their Herculean labors. It is enough to say that the result is worthy of the distinguished men who have contributed to it. Our expectations naturally rise high after reading the list of contributors at the end of this volume, a list which includes almost all English-speaking economists and many famous foreigners as well as recognized specialists upon semi-economic technicalities; and so far on most references to the work the reviewer has found his hopes fully realized. The editor seems to have been extraordinarily successful in securing articles on their subjects by the authors of standard works; thus we find Mr. Bonar writing on Population, Mr. Acworth on Railways, Mr. Mackay on the Poor Law, Professor Ingram on several of the writers he has investigated for his history, and Professor Sidgwick on Political Economy, to mention but a few